Abstract
To what extent are people subject to moral licensing? Rather than just examining moral licensing and cleansing at an aggregate level, we investigate experimentally the moral dynamics at a disaggregated level. Using a combination of two symmetric games (i.e. Giving and Taking games), we found that aggregate results occult heterogeneity that can be used to improve policy performance. Overall, half of the participants adopts compensatory behaviour. Compensatory behaviour is not necessarily directly related to the first decision, but is mainly explained by individuals’ characteristics as well as the framing of the games. Men are, in general, more consistent than women, however when they adopt licensing, the extent of compensation is far more important than for women. Highly environmentally concerned individuals are more generous than less environmentally concerned individuals, and also compensate more frequently. The framing of the donation game impacts first donations, andmoreover impacts the type of inconsistency people might adopt. We suggest that policymakerscan improve policy performances by avoiding a ‘one-size-fits-all management’ and tailoringtheir approaches according to this heterogeneity of moral dynamics.