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Smug Alert! Exploring self-licensing behaviour in a cheating game
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Smug Alert! Exploring self-licensing behaviour in a cheating game

Sophie Clot, Gilles Grolleau et Lisette Ibanez
Economics Letters, Vol.123(2), pp.191-194
2014

Résumé

Self-licensing Behavioral experiment Prosocial preference human behaviour mécanisme de compensation honneteté comportement humain
We test experimentally a prediction of the ‘moral credit model’, in which committing a virtuous act creates moral credits that can license immoral behaviour in a succeeding decision. We use a basic cheating experiment that was either preceded by a virtuous deed or not in a developing country context. We found that people who previously achieved a good deed cheat more. Gender and origin are also significant explicative variables for cheating.

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