Logo image
Se connecter
Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts
Article de revue   Avec comité de lecture

Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts

Guillaume Cheikbossian et Romain Fayat
Economics Letters, Vol.168, pp.77-81
2018

Résumé

Group contest Complementarity (Impure) Public good Group size paradox
We revisit the group size paradox in a model where two groups of different sizes compete for a prize exhibiting a varying degree of rivalry and where group effort is given by a CES function of individual efforts. We show that the larger group can be more successful than the smaller group if the degree of complementarity is sufficiently high relative to the degree of rivalry of the prize.

Fichiers et liens (1)

url
Find in HALAfficher

Indicateurs

1 Consultations de la notice

Détails

Logo image