Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly

Edmond Baranes; Jean-Christophe Poudou

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.012

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Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly

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Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly

Edmond Baranes et Jean-Christophe Poudou

Economics letters, Vol.106(3), pp.172-176

01/03/2010

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.012

Résumé

Access

Collusion

Regulation

Vertical structure

This paper revisits the conventional doctrine that “it is easier to collude among equals”, applied in the context of vertically related markets. In a differentiated duopoly model, we study how cost-based access price regulation may hinder the sustainability of tacit collusion.

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Détails

Titre: Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly
Créateurs - sans rôle: Edmond Baranes - Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier, Espace Richter, av. de la Mer, CS 79606, 34960 Montpellier cedex 2, France
Jean-Christophe Poudou - Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier, France
Détails de publication: Economics letters, Vol.106(3), pp.172-176
Éditeur: Elsevier B.V
Nombre de pages: 5
Identifiants: 99156926809311
Unité académique: Montpellier Recherche en Economie - MRE
Langue: English
Type de ressource: Journal article