Résumé
In this thesis we investigate the problem of nonpoint source pollution (NPSP) control. We look to the problem of NPSP control as a double informational problem which are moral hazard and adverse selection. We have proceeded by decomposition of these two informational problems which characterize the nonpoint source pollution. Thus the regulator designs a collective performance based incentive and delegates the distribution of the abatement effort to the collective who meet the ambient pollution standard through a negotiation process or a tradable permits market. Thus the regulator is focused on the design on collective performance based incentive which will ensure that each agent involved in non point source pollution will have interest to be in the collective rather than out. Once this group of nonpoint source polluters is formed, the collective abatement effort sets by the regulator should be distributed among its members. This thesis shows that agents who accept the collective responsibility for ambient pollution, i.e. who accept to join the collective, benefit from the efficient allocation of collective abatement effort through the two proposed distribution schemes.