Abstract
Regardless of the scope, recent evolutions in regulatory procedures reveals an opening of decision-making processes and the constant development of negotiation.From the early 80’s, Pr. Amselek already identified an “evolution de la technique juridique dans les sociétés occidentales” which would be reflected in such developments.However, this crossed study of regulatory authorities’ methods unveils the rise of an original combination between the ability to include operators through their participation or adhesion, and the possibility to spontaneously recur to creative instruments on the fringe of conventional administrative acts and procedures typology. Regulatory procedures hence compose with new fields modulated by regulated operators as well as regulators, respectively identified as actors of the regulatory process.Nevertheless, the irruption of willingness within a structurally unbalanced relationship between public authorities and private operators is neither without cause nor without consequences upon the legal environment it falls within. Although seemingly typical, economic regulation highlights the depths of such causes. Invariable inclination towards open procedures and the will of the parties above formal regulatory practices is nourished by dynamics and circumstances specific to the considered field. The present research endeavors to establish its topology, through questioning the role of such willingness of the parties among regulatory procedures. By contrast, consequences of the praise of choice either from the regulator or the regulated, seldom analyzed, are more difficult to systematize.This study ventures to highlight adjustment vectors and consider signs of a reconfiguration of the regulatory system throughout the phenomenon of compliance.