Résumé
We describe the first polynomial time chosen-plaintext to-tal break of the NICE family of cryptosystems based on ideal arith-metic in imaginary quadratic orders, introduced in the late 90's by Hart-mann, Paulus and Takagi [HPT99]. The singular interest of these en-cryption schemes is their natural quadratic decryption time procedure that consists essentially in applying Euclid's algorithm. The only current specific cryptanalysis of these schemes is Jaulmes and Joux's chosen-ciphertext attack to recover the secret key [JJ00]. Originally, Hartmann et al. claimed that the security against a total break attack relies only on the difficulty of factoring the public discriminant ∆q = −pq 2 , although the public key was also composed of a specific element of the class group of the order of discriminant ∆q, which is crucial to reach the quadratic decryption complexity. In this article, we propose a drastic cryptanalysis which factors ∆q (and hence recovers the secret key), only given this element, in cubic time in the security parameter. As a result, performing our cryptanalysis on a cryptographic example takes less than a second on a standard PC.