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Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts
Acte de colloque

Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts

Guillaume Cheikbossian et Romain Fayat
International workshop on Environmental Economics and Natural Resources (Rennes, France, 12/06/2018–13/06/2018)

Résumé

(impure) public good complementarity group contest group size paradox D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D73 - Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D74 - Conflict • Conflict Resolution • Alliances • Revolutions
We revisit the group size paradox in a model where two groups of different sizes compete for a prize exhibiting a varying degree of rivalry and where group effort is given by a CES function of individual efforts. We show that the larger group can be more successful than the smaller group if the degree of complementarity is sufficiently high relative to the degree of rivalry of the prize

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