Résumé
This paper focuses on environmental goods production when contracted by means of agrienvironmental agreements. It is explicitly accounted for jointness among environmental goods and for heterogeneity among farms. Two different types of agri-environmental programmes are considered: 1) part farm programmes, which give to the farmer the liberty to subscribe only a part of the eligible land, and 2) whole farm programmes, which explicitly ask for involving of all the land. Applicability of menus of contracts designed to deal with the adverse selection problem in the Principal-Agent framework is analysed using a general quadratic multi-output cost function. Obtained results are compared with the uniform payment contract option. It is proved that in some cases whole farm programmes are less expensive than part farm programmes and thus Government can save public funds by asking farmers to produce more environmental goods. Also the adverse selection is less a problem in whole farm programmes than in part farm programmes. A numerical simulation is carried out using parameters of the cost function estimated for environmental goods production by suckler cow farms in the Protected Landscape Area White Carpathians in the Czech Republic by a mathematical programming farm level model.