Negotiating over the allocation of water resources: the strategic importance of bargaining structure

Rachael Goodhue; Gordon C. Rausser; Leo K. Simon; Sophie Thoyer

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Negotiating over the allocation of water resources: the strategic importance of bargaining structure

Rachael Goodhue, Gordon C. Rausser, Leo K. Simon et Sophie Thoyer

Game theory and policy making in natural resources and the environment

2008

Résumé

négociation

politique de l'eau

politique de l'environnement

négociation multilatérale

gestion de l'eau

In this chapter, the Rausser-Simon multilateral bargaining model is applied to a specific negotiation regarding the use of a water resource in order to illustrate the effects that decisions regarding negotiation structure have on the ultimate outcome of the bargaining process. The results highlight a number of aspects of the relationship between negotiation structure and bargaining power.

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Détails

Titre: Negotiating over the allocation of water resources: the strategic importance of bargaining structure
Créateurs - sans rôle: Rachael Goodhue - Resource (United States)
Gordon C. Rausser - University of California [Berkeley]
Leo K. Simon - University of California [Berkeley]
Sophie Thoyer - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée
Contributeurs - sans rôle: Ariel Dinar (Editeur)
José Albiac (Editeur)
Joaquin Sanchez-Soriano (Editeur)
Détails de publication: Game theory and policy making in natural resources and the environment
Identifiants: 99174174709311
Unité académique: Université de Montpellier
Langue: English
Type de ressource: Book chapter
Champs locaux: hal-02820842